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IS STATE PREEMPTION WEAKENING 
THE AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES?
The strength of free peoples resides in the local community. Local institutions are 
to liberty what primary schools are to science; they put it within the people’s reach; 
they teach people to appreciate its peaceful enjoyment and accustom them to make 
use of it. Without local institutions a nation may give itself a free government, but 
it has not the spirit of liberty1.
In many countries in the world today democratic institutions and ideals 
seem threatened. Due process, equal protection, freedom of speech, freedom 
of the press, the right to vote, and other democratic ideals are deeply ingrained in 
US culture and government. Traditionally, the federal government is thought to be 
the guardian of these rights, ensuring that state governments adhere to the rule 
of law established by our written constitution. Similarly, state governments are 
thought to uphold these democratic ideals vis a vis local governments. The Amer-
ican system of checks and balances and separation of powers and the resulting 
interplay between the branches of government are considered safeguards that 
protect the rule of law. This horizontal separation of powers – executive, legisla-
tive and judicial – often overshadows the similar function served by the vertical 
separation of governmental power created by our division of governmental power 
into federal, state and local. 
Thus, at least in theory, if the federal and state governments act contrary 
to the rule of law established by our federal and state constitutions, local govern-
ments offer at least some degree of authoritarian resilience. History provides sev-
eral examples of authoritarian regimes which upon attaining power acted quickly 
1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, G. Lawrence (transl.) 1966.
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to abolish or severely limit the powers of local governments2. The motivations 
that lie behind the suppression of local governments as a precursor to establishing 
anti-democratic regimes recognize the important role that local governments play 
in protecting democratic ideals. What power, then, do local governments possess 
that will allow them to preserve democratic ideals in spite of the contrary actions 
being taken by “higher” levels of government? 
First, this article will discuss the concept and operation of vertical separa-
tion of powers in the United States. Secondly, it will discuss the danger posed 
to authoritarian resilience in the United States by the recent increase in State 
preemptions of local government power – particularly in regard to sanctuary 
cities, climate change, gun regulation, and LGBT rights – and with a particular 
emphasis on affordable housing. Finally, the manner in which local governments 
may resist anti-democratic action from federal and state governments will be 
examined. 
1. VERTICAL SEPARATION OF POWERS: THE ROLE OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
From the beginning of our nation, local governments have played a major 
role in all aspects of government, politics and daily life. They play that role as 
independent – although inferior sovereigns – and not as instrumentalities or 
administrative divisions of the national government as is the case in many other 
countries3. Alexis de Tocqueville, that great observer of American Democracy, 
grasped the importance of local government in the passage quoted from him 
at the beginning of this article. The contemporary validity of his observations 
is confirmed by the following analysis in How Cities Will Save the World:
The governmental structure in the US lends itself to urban innovation. Eighty years 
ago, US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandies described the flexibility to innovate 
available to states in the American federal system as follows: the “state may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country”. Cities and local governments are the ro-
oms inside those laboratories, where local experimentation can flourish just as far as 
the imagination, the political will, and the urban pragmatic spirit can take it4.
2 Nazi Germany for instance. See W. Rinderle, B. Norling, The Nazi Impact on a German 
Village, Lexington 1994, pp. 107-109; H. Kupper, The Concept of Multilayered Statehood in the 
System of Russian Federalism, “Review of Central and Eastern Europe Law” 2013, Vol. 38, pp. 
239-266.
3 France is a good example.
4 R. Brescia, J. Travis Marshall (eds.), How Cities Will Save the World: Urban Innovation in 
the Face of Population Flows, Climate Change and Economic Inequality, Routledge 2016.
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International symposia which include discussions of American Law generally 
concentrate – often exclusively – on our federal government and its laws, policies 
and politics. For American citizens, however, this often misses the mark, as Pro-
fessor Briffault has observed, even though the role of the federal government has 
expanded tremendously since the early days of the Republic and the time frame 
in which de Tocqueville made his observations:
Yet states and local governments continue to play a significant role in American 
governance. As in Madison’s day, for most people “the ordinary course of affairs” 
remains largely the domain of state and local governments. The rules that structure 
civil society – contract law, tort law, property and land use law, criminal law, family 
law, the incorporation of businesses, the regulation of the professions – are deve-
loped, implemented, and enforced primarily at the state and local levels. So, too, 
most public services that affect people in their homes and families – public schools, 
policing and the incarceration of offenders, public safety, the provision of clean wa-
ter and the removal of solid waste and sewage, maintenance of roads and streets, 
public parks, public hospitals and emergency medical services – are provided by 
states and localities, not the federal government. The vast majority of the opportuni-
ties for participation in political life – such as running for office, campaigning for or 
against a ballot proposition, or appearing before such critical governing institutions 
as the school board, the planning and zoning commission, or a town meeting – are 
at the state and local level, too5.
First a bit of a primer for international readers. It is well known that the United 
States is composed of 50 States6 which have residual power over aspects of gov-
ernment not granted to the federal government7. What is less well known and 
appreciated is the importance and role of local governments, to again quote Pro-
fessor Briffault:
There are more than 90,000 of them and they differ dramatically in powers, status, 
organization, function, authority, and mode of creation across the country and, in-
deed, within a particular state. There is not even a consistent terminology for local 
governments; different states include such diverse local units as parishes, boroughs, 
and townships, as well as the more common forms of local government like coun-
ty or city. Unlike the states, local governments may – and frequently do – overlap 
each other’s territory. Unlike the states, local governments are frequently created, 
modified territorially, or abolished. Unlike the states, local governments lack inhe-
rent law-making authority. So, too, while the federal Constitution makes frequent 
5 R. Briffault, L. Reynolds, Cases and Materials on State and Local Government Law, 
St. Paul, Mn. 2016, 8th ed.
6 And some “territories”.
7 For an in-depth analysis of American federalism and the Rule of Law, see R. A. Schapiro, 
How Federalism Can Promote a National Commitment to the Rule of Law, “Studia Iuridica”, this 
issue.
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reference to the state, the federal Constitution is entirely silent on the subject of local 
governments8.
The powers possessed by local governments vary from state to state. It is tra-
ditional to group states into two categories in this regard: 1. Home rule states and 
2. Dillon’s rule jurisdictions. Simply stated, in home rule states local governments 
have all powers necessary for them to operate as governments unless the pow-
ers in question are directly withheld from them by the state constitution or laws 
consistent with the constitution enacted by the state legislature. In Dillion’s rule 
jurisdictions, local governments only have those powers which are directly and 
specifically delegated to them by state constitutions or laws passed consistent 
therewith. In reality local government powers in the various states fit more into 
a continuum between those extremes. As a leading local government law treatise 
phrases it:
The power of home rule is generally understood as synonymous with local auto-
nomy: the freedom of a local unit of government to pursue self-determined goals 
without interference by its State legislature or other agencies of State government. 
The possibilities for local autonomy run along a spectrum. At one end local govern-
ments are forbidden to do anything unless the State legislature or State constitution 
has expressly and unambiguously authorized them to do it. At the other end, local go-
vernments are authorized to do anything the State legislature can do that has not been 
explicitly forbidden by State law. Thus, in this theoretical world, local governments 
at the low autonomy end of the spectrum could not ban fracking in their territories, 
raise the minimum age, or ban smoking in bars and restaurants unless they could 
first point to a State statute that clearly gives them the power to do so. On the high 
autonomy end of the spectrum, local governments, responding to local concerns on 
their own initiative, would have the power to enact their policy preferences unless 
otherwise prevented by State law9.
Regardless of which category – or where on the spectrum – a state’s local gov-
ernments are placed, the fact remains that all US local governments legislate and 
set policy in regard to matters of local concern which affect daily life more than 
much of what the Federal and state governments do. Of course, conflicts between 
state and local governments often arise over disagreements as to what constitutes 
a “matter of local concern”10.
Areas such as zoning, education, and housing are generally considered “of 
local concern” as within the home rule ambit. However, local governments have 
recently taken a more progressive approach to local laws, passing legislation that 
seeks to set a minimum wage higher than the federal floor, passing more restrictive 
 8 R. Briffault, L. Reynolds, Cases and Materials…
 9 See S. M. Stevenson, Antieau on Local Government Law §21.01, Newark, N.J, 2009, 2nd ed.; 
see also: J. Martinez, 1 Local Government Law, §4:1 et seqq., Rochester, N.Y. 2018. 
10 E. A. Schraff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?, 
“Georgetown Law Journal” 2018, Vol. 106. (Statewide and local concern categories are “porous”).
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gun control laws, regulations limiting the use of plastic bags, enacting the so called 
bathroom bills, etc. These areas relate more to commercial activities and have been 
the source of considerable pushback from the state governments. In response, state 
governments have been aggressively passing “preemption” legislation that specifi-
cally limits a local government’s ability to legislate in certain areas. 
2. CURRENT TREND OF STATE PREEMPTION: 
THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING EXAMPLE
American cities are under attack. The last few years have witnessed an explosion 
of preemptive legislation challenging and overriding municipal ordinance across 
a wide-range of policy areas. City – state conflicts over the municipal minimum 
wage, LGBT anti-discrimination, and sanctuary city laws have garnered the most 
attention, but these conflicts are representative of a larger trend toward state aggran-
dizement. These legal challenges to municipal regulation have been accompanied 
by an increasingly shrill anti-city politics, emanating from both state and federal 
officials11.
The growing deficit of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income 
households is a major concern for American cities12. Local Governments often 
attempt to increase affordable housing stock within a community through inclu-
sionary zoning ordinances pursuant to which as a condition of development per-
mission a residential developer is required or incentivized to set aside a percentage 
of the units for which development permits are sought for sale or lease to persons 
of low or moderate income at below market rates13. Local government efforts in 
this regard are thwarted or at least complicated by the rise of state preemption 
of municipal authority14. In recent years, state preemption statutes have become 
much more prevalent15. Preemption statutes also now touch on a vast range of sub-
ject matters, including affordable housing stock16. In fact, just last year, Wiscon-
11 R. C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, “Texas Law Review” 2018, Vol. 96.
12 M. Hobbes, Affordable Housing Problem is a Ticking Time Bomb, “The Huffington Post” 
19 June 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/housing-crisis-inequality-harvard-report_
us_5b27c1f1e4b056b2263c621e (visited February 18, 2019).
13 J. C. Juergensmeyer et al., Land Use Planning and Development Regulation Law, St. Paul, 
Mn. 2018, § 6:7A.
14 See R. Briffault, The Challenge of New Preemption, “Stanford Law Review” 2018, Vol. 70; 
R. Schragger, State Preemption of Local Laws: Preliminary Review of Substantive Areas, Legal 
Efforts to Address Preemption (LEAP) Project, May 2017.
15 Ibidem.
16 Ibidem.
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sin successfully passed a statute preempting municipal authority from enacting 
inclusionary zoning ordinances17. 
Inclusionary zoning ordinances are either mandatory or voluntary18. Inclu-
sionary zoning is mandatory when it requires developers to set aside a certain 
number of housing units at a below market rate for low- and moderate-income 
households within a project19. This reduced rate may apply to housing units for 
sale or for rent20. A municipality may have voluntary inclusionary zoning in addi-
tion or as an alternative to mandatory inclusionary zoning21. Voluntary inclusion-
ary zoning is incentives-based22. For example, a city may offer a density bonus 
when a developer includes housing for sale at rates below the market price23.
As alluded to above, rental units may be subject to inclusionary zoning ordi-
nances. When an inclusionary zoning ordinance includes a reduced rate for rent, 
the ordinance may be characterized as rent control24. Rent control establishes 
a certain maximum in rent price and may curb increases thereafter25. There are 
some jurisdictions, however, that have separate rent control and inclusionary zon-
ing schemes, like New York and California26.
17 Wis. Stat. § 66.1015. In recent years, other states, like North Carolina and Louisiana, have 
also been pushing for preemption on affordable housing. See K. Litten, J. B. Edwards, Vetoes Ban 
on Affordable Housing Requirements for Developers, “The Times Picayune” 29 May 2018, https://
www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2018/05/edwards_vetoes_inclusionary_ho.html (visited Febru-
ary 25, 2019); K. Capps, Preempting the Rights of North Carolina Cities to Govern Themselves, 
“CityLab” 29 September 2015, https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/09/preempting-the-right-of-
north-carolina-cities-to-govern-themselves/408058/ (visited February 25, 2019). Although both 
North Carolina and Louisiana were unsuccessful in 2017, it is notable that preemption on afford-
able housing has become a heated issue during state legislative sessions. Interestingly, in 2016 
Oregon passed a statute on affordable housing at the state level to permit inclusionary zoning after 
a seventeen-year prohibition against inclusionary zoning. See Oregon Revised Statutes § 320.192 
(2017); D. C. Theriault, Kate Brown Signs Bill on Affordable Housing Rules, Renter Relief, “The 
Oregonian” 17 March 2016, https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/ index.ssf/2016/03/kate_ brown_
signs_bills_on_affo.html (visited February 25, 2019).
18 See V. J. Pinedo, Note, Embracing the Excluded: Using Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning 
to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing in St. Louis, “Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy” 
2016, Vol. 26.
19 Ibidem.
20 e.g., Burlington, Vt. Inclusionary and Replacement Housing Code § 9.1.8. Notably, Atlanta’s 
inclusionary zoning ordinance refers only to rental units. Atlanta, Ga. Affordable Workforce 
Housing Code §16.36A.004.
21 See V. J. Pinedo, Embracing the Excluded…
22 Ibidem.
23 Ibidem.
24 This is true even if reduced rent is not necessarily required by the ordinance and may be 
a part of a larger scheme with several components at play to increase affordable housing. See Town 
of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, LLC, 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000). 
25 M. W. Cordes, Thompson on Real Property § 43.04(a) 1994.
26 See N. I. El Mallakh, Comment: Does the Costa-Hawkins Act Prohibit Local Inclusionary 
Zoning Programs?, “California Law Review” 2001, Vol. 89; V. Chau, J. Yager, Article: Zoning For 
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States preempt municipal authority in enacting inclusionary zoning ordi-
nances both explicitly and implicitly. There are at least four states that explic-
itly preempt mandatory inclusionary zoning: Arizona27, Arkansas28, Texas29, 
and Wisconsin30. Notably, however, nearly all of these states do expressly per-
mit ordinances that create voluntary and incentive-based programs31. The only 
exception is Wisconsin, which prohibits both mandatory and voluntary inclusion-
ary ordinances32. 
Many affordable housing programs include provisions for rent control by 
limiting a certain percentage of rental units to low and moderate income indi-
viduals at below market rates. At least twenty-eight states preempt municipal 
enactment of rent control ordinances through explicit statutory prohibitions: 
Alabama33, Arizona34, Arkansas35, Colorado36, Florida37, Georgia38, Idaho39, 
Illinois40, Indiana41, Iowa42, Kansas43, Kentucky44, Massachusetts45, Michi-
gan46 Minnesota47 Mississippi48 Missouri49 New Mexico50 North Carolina51 
Affordability: Using the Case of New York To Explore Whether Zoning Can Be Used To Achieve 
Income-Diverse Neighborhoods, 25 “New York University Environmental Law Journal 2017, 
Vol. 25.
27 Arizona Revised Statutes Ann. § 9-461.16 (2017).
28 Arkansas Code Ann. § 14-54-1604 (2017).
29 Texas Code Ann. § 214.905 (2017).
30 Wis. Stat. § 66.1015 (2017).
31 Arizona Revised Statutes Ann. § 9-461.16 (2017); Arkansas Code Ann. § 14-54-1604 
(2017); Indiana Code § 32-31-1-20 (2017); Kansas Statutes Ann. § 12-16,120 (2017); Tennessee 
Code Ann. § 66-35-102 (2017). Tex. Code Ann. § 214.905 (2017).
32 Wis. Stat. § 66.1015 (2017).
33 Alabama Code § 11-80-8.1 (2017).
34 Arizona Revised Statutes Ann. § 33-1329 (2017).
35 Arkansas Code Ann. § 14-16-601(2017).
36 Colorado Revised Statutes § 38-12-301 (2017).
37 Florida Statutes §166.043 (2017).
38 Georgia Code Ann. § 44-7-19 (2017).
39 Idaho Code § S5-307 (2017).
40 50 Illinois Compiled Statutes 825/5 (2017).
41 Indiana Code § 32-31-1-20 (2017).
42 Iowa Code § 364.3 (2017).
43 Kansas Statutes Ann. § 12-16,120 (2017).
44 Kentucky Revised Statutes Ann. § 65.875 (2017).
45 Massachusetts General Laws ch. 40P, § 4-5 (2017).
46 Michigan Compiled Laws § 123.411(2017).
47 Minnesota Statutes §471.9996 (2017).
48 Mississippi Code Ann. § 21-17-5 (2017).
49 Missouri Revised Statutes § 441.043 (2017).
50 New Mexico Statutes Ann. § 47-8A-1(2017).
51 North Carolina General Statutes § 42-14.1(2017).
 IS STATE PREEMPTION WEAKENING THE AUTHORITARIAN... 155
North Dakota52 Oklahoma53, Oregon54, South Carolina55, South Dakota56, Ten-
nessee57, Texas58, Utah59, Washington60, and Wisconsin61. There are at least 
an additional four states wherein the respective courts found municipalities did 
not have authority to adopt rent control ordinances: Connecticut,62 Louisiana63, 
New Hampshire64, and Virginia65. The prevalence of rent control preemption in 
comparison to mandatory inclusionary zoning preemption is significant because 
rent control preemption frustrates mandatory inclusionary zoning. Therefore, 
although only four states have explicitly preempted mandatory inclusionary zon-
ing, many more states may have implicitly preempted mandatory inclusionary 
zoning through its rent control preemption statutes.
A state’s rent control preemption statute may frustrate a local mandatory 
inclusionary zoning ordinance if there is a component of the zoning ordinance 
that regulates rent below market prices66. If the inclusionary zoning ordinance 
is found to be a form of rental control, and municipalities are expressly prohibited 
from enacting rent control ordinances, the only way the ordinance can supersede 
the statute is if the state is home rule and the court finds rental control to be a local 
matter67. This finding is also unlikely as state uniformity in regulation is a high 
priority68. In addition, although rental control is arguably a land use issue, which 
would imply local regulation, a rental control ordinance may be found to be eco-
nomic legislation, which is a state matter69.
There are two ways to look at the recent conflicts between state and local 
governments: (1) either the local governments have exceeded the grant of legis-
52 North Dakota Century Code § 47-16-02.1 (2017).
53 Oklahoma Statutes tit. 11, §14-101.1 (2017).
54 Oregon Revised Statutes § 91.225 (2017).
55 South Carolina Code Ann. § 27-39-60 (2017).
56 South Dakota Codified Laws § §6-1-13 (2017).
57 Tennessee Code Ann. § 66-35-102 (2017).
58 Texas Code. Ann. § 214.902 (West 2017).
59 Utah Code Ann. § 57-20-1 (West 2017).
60 Washington Revised Code § 35.21.830 (2017).
61 Wis. Stat. § 66.1015 (2017).
62 Old Colony Gardens, Inc. v. Stamford, 156 A.2d 515 (Conn. 1959).
63 Jayers v. Council of New Orleans, 351 So. 2d 247 (La. 1977).
64 Girard v. Allenstown, 428 A.2d 488 (N.H. 1981).
65 Fairfax Cty. v. De Groff Enterprises, 198 S.E.2d 600 (Va. 1973).
66 See Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, LLC, 3 P.3d (Colo. 2000). But See 
Mallakh, Comment… (arguing rent control and inclusionary zoning are separate and distinct legal 
mechanisms).
67 J. Juergensmeyer et. al., Land Use Planning…, 50–51; See also Town of Telluride v. Lot 
Thirty-Four Venture, LLC, 3 P.3d 30 (Colorado 2000).
68 Ibidem.
69 See Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, LLC, 3 P.3d 30, fn. 9 (Colorado 2000); 
See also K. A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, “Brigham Young University 
Law Review“ 2016, Vol. 177.
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lative power and must be checked, or (2) state governments are using preemption 
to suppress what should be considered legitimate areas of local legislation. We 
subscribe to the latter view.
We would argue that the current conflict between state and local govern-
ments is largely a political fight. Both left and right are using local governments 
and their localized responses to local values as an invitation to have political 
debates that appear to be national in scope. These local governments are legis-
lating (in a representative capacity) to establish regulations that go further than 
state or federal counterparts – not in opposition to them. Instead of allowing local 
governments to experiment with different types of solutions, state governments 
have become increasingly hostile towards local experimentation and have taken 
preemptive steps to curb the adoption of regulations that go farther than state law. 
One must ask why this increased hostility is taking place, especially when local 
laws do not conflict with state laws. 
To us it seems like state governments have been blinded by politics and have 
resultantly chosen to ignore the benefits of local governments as laboratories 
where ideas can be tested. Further, these state governments are hostile to the will 
of a significant portion of the population that lives within the cities passing these 
local regulations. Residents of cities in particular do not feel represented by state-
level politicians, as many of these debated local ordinances reflect. 
State-level reactions to local government’s attempts to legislate on matters 
of individual rights, worker’s rights, housing, environmental, etc. should be 
troubling to all involved. The wave of preemption legislation is a clear signal 
of the view that local governments are not meant to be areas of experimentation – 
therefore significantly reducing the importance of the huge segments of the pop-
ulation that live in cities. 
In other words, the recent push by state governments to curb the ability of local 
governments to legislate is indicative of a fear that these local governments are 
a threat to consolidated power. The legislation most frequently drawing the ire 
of state governments is not in direct conflict with the state, but instead concerns 
giving citizens additional rights or increased protections that build upon a floor 
established by state or federal law (think minimum wage, plastic bags, bathroom 
bills). 
The republican party-dominated state governments are not truly concerned 
with the power of local governments to enact legislation or that these governments 
are abusing any granted power. Instead, the state governments are not pleased 
with the decidedly liberal-leaning policies enacted by smaller governments and 
are using the trope of “out of control local government” to curb policies contrary 
to their own. 
Dismissing the importance of local governments is a dangerous step that allows 
the few to trample on the rights of the many. It is an unfortunate fact that those in 
power often create rules that assist in maintaining power. We believe this consoli-
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dation of power on a state level is exactly such an attempt to consolidate power for 
a particular party at the expense of local governments. Stripping local governments 
of a right to legislate limits these local governments’ abilities to protect the rights 
of its citizens and removes a safeguard against larger governments acting contrary 
to democratic ideals. This could be seen as an initial step in removing an obstacle 
that allows for the establishment of a more authoritarian form of government that 
may not respect the rule of law. How then can local governments “fight back” in 
spite of significant limitations placed on their legislative competence? 
3. WAYS THAT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CAN RESIST
3.1. REFUSAL TO ENFORCE 
A well-publicized example of how local governments can resist federal gov-
ernment policies without being able to pass local legislation is demonstrated 
through the recent conflict over “sanctuary cities”. Sanctuary cities limit coopera-
tion with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement70. Here, local governments 
disagree with federal policy regarding a matter over which local governments 
are not authorized to legislate. The local governments are not actively passing 
legislation that conflicts with a national or state policy. Instead, the local govern-
ments are refusing to use the local government’s resources to enforce or imple-
ment a national or state program71. A primary tactic used by the federal and state 
governments to punish this disobedience is threatening to or actually withholding 
funds from the local government. We have seen numerous threats by the Trump 
administration to starve sanctuary cities into submission by threatening to with-
hold federal funds. Trump issued executive order 13768 early on in his presidency 
ordering that federal funds be withheld from sanctuary cities72. San Francisco 
sued in federal court, challenging the validity of an executive order73. The Ninth 
70 D. Lord, What are sanctuary cities? Here’s a list of sanctuary cities, counties, states, “The 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution” 26 January 2017, https://www.ajc.com/news/national/what-are-
sanctuary-cities-here-list-sanctuary-cities-counties-states/Y452wnIOx2hemgKx8T4gIP/ (visited 
February 25, 2019).
71 For example, the Mayor of Atlanta recently issued an executive order forbidding the city’s jails 
from accepting new ICE detainees. S. Deere, Atlanta Mayor Bottoms orders jail to refuse new ICE 
detainees, “The Atlanta Journal-Constitution” 20 June 2018, https://www.ajc.com/news/breaking-
news/atlanta-mayor-bottoms-orders-jail-refuse-new-ice-detainees/iy1rtK0WmYkk3cEbv1CeDN/ 
(visited February 25, 2019).
72 Text of the Executive Order can be found at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united-states/ (visited October 27, 2018). 
73 The lawsuit can be viewed at: https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2017/11/20/court-rules-
trumps-sanctuary-executive-order-unconstitutional/ (visited February 25, 2019).
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Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals determined that the executive 
order went too far, holding that “the Executive Branch may not refuse to disperse 
the federal grants in question without congressional authorization”74. This deci-
sion is in line with Supreme Court precedent that demands a separation of powers 
between the branches of government and that protects local governments from 
this type of punishment/coercion75. 
The Court of Appeals’ adherence to well-established precedent showed that 
attempts to bully or coerce local governments into enforcing a law with which 
they disagree can be met with legal resistance. At the very least, local govern-
ments have a choice to make and are not required to expend their limited funds 
enforcing a policy with which they disagree. Of course, a significant portion 
of local government revenue comes from the federal government. The federal 
government may withhold funding from disobedient local governments as a form 
of punishment. However, that withheld funding must be tied to the policy the local 
government is refusing to enforce. 
3.2. DECRIMINALIZATION
In the same vein, local governments can “decriminalize” certain activities. 
A popular example of this practice is demonstrated by marijuana laws. Atlanta, 
for instance, decriminalized marijuana in late 201776. This tactic is another way 
that local governments can refuse to expend resources enforcing an activity with 
which it disagrees. Decriminalizing something does not protect citizens from 
federal or state level authorities. Employing this method simply requires the fed-
eral/state governments to spend more time and resources in enforcing policies 
with which local governments disagree. A local government can “save” great 
sums of money by refusing to prosecute certain activities that it deems unworthy 
of enforcement. At the same time, the local government is making a statement 
that the citizens within its borders do not agree with the state or federal policy. 
The growing list of state and local governments that have decriminalized mar-
ijuana sheds light on an unpopular position of the federal or state government 
bodies and puts pressure on those governments to conform with the obvious will 
of a large portion of the population. Lessons learned from decriminalization can 
be extended if the federal or state government acted contrarily to the rule of law 
by criminalizing certain democratic behaviors.
74 City and County. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2018).
75 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) for a discussion of anti-commandeering, 
and South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that any denial of federal funds must be 
related only to a particular program that a state/local government is not enforcing). 
76 http://fortune.com/2017/10/03/list-of-cities-that-decriminalized-marijuana/ (visited Febru-
ary 18, 2019).
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3.3. SPEND FUNDS IN WAYS THAT INDIRECTLY CHALLENGE 
POLICIES
Local governments can uphold the rule of law by funding programs that hin-
der policies with which they disagree. California, for example, has set aside $50 
million dollars to increase legal services available to immigrants in response 
to the federal government’s current immigration policy77. Funding programs such 
as this leads to an indirect, non-legislative challenge to federal policy. There is no 
conflicting legislation on the state level and providing legal representation is cer-
tainly within the scope of state authority. Programs such as these are intended 
to express opposition to federal policy and to slow down the aims of the federal 
government. However, the basis of local oppositional programs is money. 
Local governments must be able to raise enough revenue to fund oppositional 
programs. This fact raises special concerns for local government that have lim-
ited means to raise revenue. In certain instances, state governments have reacted 
to local opposition by enacting roadblocks of their own and placing caps on prop-
erty taxes or assessment limits78. Doing so severely limits a local government’s 
ability to raise revenue and makes it more difficult to fund oppositional programs. 
A government cannot exist without a revenue stream. Property taxes are 
the second largest source of revenue for local governments, accounting for approx-
imately 30% of all revenue79. The largest source of income for local governments 
are direct transfers from larger governments80. One does not have to look too 
far to see that legislation enacted on a state level capping property tax rates has 
the effect of severely limiting a local government’s overall ability to raise revenue.
Taxes are rarely popular. Therefore, convincing voters that property tax caps 
are a good thing is quite easy. Voters are generally not going to be aware of the con-
sequences of these caps. In reality, the state governments have served to consoli-
date power by making local governments more dependent on state resources and 
far less likely to enact or fund policies that hinder policies of the state govern-
ment. Citizens should be educated on the consequences of limitations on local 
revenue streams if indirect challenges are to continue. 
77 J. Ulloa, Nearly $50 million in the California state budget will go to expanded legal services 
for immigrants, “The Los Angeles Times” 15 June 2017, http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/
la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-nearly-50-million-in-the-california-1497576640-htmlstory.
html (visited February 18, 2019).
78 Significant Features of the Property Tax, http://datatoolkits.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/
significant-features-property-tax/Report_Tax_Limits.aspx (visited February 18, 2019). Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy and George Washington Institute of Public Policy. 
79 https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-local-finance-initia-
tive/projects/state-and-local-backgrounders/property-taxes (last visited October 30, 2018). 
80 Ibidem. 
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3.4. ENACT LEGISLATION IN AREAS NOT YET PREEMPTED/
CHALLENGE PREEMPTION IN COURTS
As discussed above, state governments have been enacting “new preemption” 
legislation that seeks to specifically prohibit local governments from legislating 
in certain areas81. Some states have passed measures that go even farther and 
allow for the removal of a local official that knowingly enacts such conflicting 
legislation82. These so called “punitive” preemption measures are intended to send 
a clear message to local governments. Namely, that the state government is in 
charge and any challenges from local governments will not be tolerated. These 
types of laws should be of concern because they are just the sort of consolidation 
of power that can stifle the rule of law by unnecessarily limiting political dissent 
on the local level. There are conventional methods of preemption legislation that 
do not require such stifling tactics. 
For instance, if a state truly wants to occupy the field in a certain legisla-
tive area, then that state should pass a law of general applicability that does so. 
The problem with many of these “new preemption” laws is that states are not 
actively passing laws of general applicability but are instead simply forbidding 
local governments from legislating in certain matters. The only recourse of local 
governments is to challenge the validity of these laws in courts. However, the chal-
lenges are hindered by two obstacles: differing conceptions of local autonomy 
based in state constitutions and the costs of litigation.
Even in states that will entertain a legal challenge to these types of laws, local 
governments will be unlikely to afford the costs of litigation – especially when 
compounded with limitations on revenue collection discussed earlier. Still, legal 
challenges may grow in frequency. The courts of at least one state, Ohio, have 
struck down preemption legislation unless the local law conflicts with an existing 
statewide law of general applicability83. 
3.5. PROVIDE GREATER ACCESS TO GOVERNMENTAL 
INFORMATION
Local governments can use websites as a tool to resist oppressive activities 
of the federal or state governments. This tool has the advantage of being both 
simple and cost-effective. The sites can be tailored such that they enable citizens 
to respond to particular issues. For instance, in the case of hostile larger govern-
81 See R. Briffault, The Challenge…
82 Ibidem, 2003.
83 See footnote 23. City of Cleveland v. State, 5 N.E.3d 644 (Ohio 2014),
 
City of Cleveland v. 
State, 2017 WL 6055031 (Ohio Ct. App., Dec. 7, 2017). City of Dayton v. State, 87 N.E.3d 176 
(Ohio 2017); City of Toledo v. State, 56 N.E.3d 997, (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). 
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ment activity such as “new preemption” legislation discussed above, local gov-
ernments could use their websites as platforms geared to educate citizens about 
certain issues and as a forum for citizens to gather to discuss these issues.
Education should be a primary goal of these sites. Many citizens do not under-
stand the interplay between federal/state/local governments. Providing a simple 
explanation of this interplay would be extremely helpful in situations where 
the federal or state governments are seeking to thwart local activities. Local gov-
ernments could use websites to explain what they are trying to accomplish and 
how those governments are trying to stop them from doing so. The sites could 
explain the legal framework in which the local government is working. For exam-
ple, the site could explain home rule powers and whether the local government 
possesses those powers. The sites could explain the taxation powers of the local 
government and provide a breakdown of the entity’s revenue streams. The site 
could provide a local budget and breakdown of anticipated spending, etc. These 
facts could then be used to explain the local government’s stance on a particular 
issue and how that differs from the state or federal government. Providing citi-
zens with this type of information would, in turn, allow those citizens to make 
more informed arguments when deciding how they wish to be governed. 
Aside from simply providing information, the local government site could act 
as a forum for the people to discuss issues. Because populations have increased, 
and people’s schedules may hinder them from physically gathering to discuss 
politics, a local government website could assist in facilitating political speech. 
Doing so would be particularly useful when a state or federal government is act-
ing to suppress local activities. Providing a convenient, central location where 
local citizens could discuss matters of local import would be crucial in times 
of active suppression. Local government websites can easily be tailored to serve 
this function. 
The sites will be invaluable tools in responding to violations of the rule of law 
because local governments may not be in a position to directly respond to oppres-
sive tactics. There may be budgetary concerns or responsive legislation may not 
be a possibility. However, by taking the steps outlined above to provide access 
to government information, these local governments could encourage private 
action. In times of crisis, people may not be able to look to local governments 
to provide a direct response. Instead, the people themselves may need to band 
together to create a non-governmental front against oppressive government 
action. The local government would not be directly acting to oppose state action 
but could provide useful tools to those who could. Providing access to data and 
a forum through which the public could meet would be necessary in times when 
the federal or state governments seek to defeat the rule of law.
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4. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, governments at different levels are intended to monitor each other 
in an effort to respond to the demands of the governed. The relationship between 
the different levels is simply another ingrained check meant to ensure that the rule 
of law is upheld and democratic ideals preserved. Consequently, when local gov-
ernments are preempted from exercising their powers in regard to socially impor-
tant issues their authoritarian resilience is seriously impaired. This enhanced 
level of preemption has been labeled “Hyper Preemption” and identified as a new 
brand of preemption “which seeks not just to curtail specific local policies, but, 
rather, to chill local policy making (…) and punish local governments or their 
public officials for taking policy positions (…)”84. If state governments, aided by 
the federal government continue to adopt such preemptive measures, then as Pro-
fessor Schraff has predicted it will dramatically reshape our state-local relation-
ship and the consequences will include a weakened ability of local government 
to protect the rule of law.
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Summary
In many countries in the world today democratic institutions and ideals seem 
threatened. Due process, equal protection, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, 
the right to vote, and other democratic ideals are deeply ingrained in US culture and 
government. Traditionally, the federal government is thought to be the guardian of these 
rights, ensuring that state governments adhere to the rule of law established by our 
written constitution. Similarly, state governments are thought to uphold these democratic 
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ideals vis a vis local governments. The American system of checks and balances and 
separation of powers and the resulting interplay between the branches of government are 
considered safeguards that protect the rule of law. This horizontal separation of powers 
often overshadows the similar function served by the vertical separation of governmental 
power created by our division of power into federal, state and local. If the federal and 
state governments act contrary to the rule of law established by our federal and state 
constitutions, local governments offer at least some degree of authoritarian resilience. 
The goal of this article is to set forth the manner in which local governments may 
resist anti-democratic action from federal and state governments and then to discuss 
the danger posed in the United States by the recent increase in State preemptions of local 
government power – particularly in regard to sanctuary cities, climate change, gun 
regulation, affordable housing, and LGBT rights. Ultimately, governments at different 
levels are intended to monitor each other and when local governments are preempted 
from exercising their powers in regard to socially important issues their authoritarian 
resilience is seriously impaired.
KEY WORDS
local government, United States, state preemption, vertical separation of powers
Streszczenie
W wielu krajach instytucje i wartości demokratyczne są zagrożone. Sprawiedliwy 
proces, ochrona praw obywatelskich, wolność słowa, wolność prasy, prawo do głoso-
wania i inne demokratyczne ideały są głęboko zakorzenione w amerykańskiej kulturze 
prawnej. Tradycyjnie rząd federalny jest uważany za strażnika tych praw, zapewniając, 
że administracja stanowa przestrzega rządów prawa ustanowionych przez amerykańską 
Konstytucję. Podobnie uważa się, że administracja stanowa zapewnia te demokratyczne 
standardy wobec samorządów lokalnych. Amerykański system równowagi władz i trój-
podział władzy oraz wynikające z tego wzajemne oddziaływanie między gałęziami ad-
ministracji są uważane za zabezpieczenia, które chronią praworządność. Ten poziomy 
trójpodział władzy często przyćmiewa podobne funkcje realizowane przez pionowe roz-
dzielenie władzy pomiędzy system federalny, stanowy i lokalny. Jeśli władza federalna 
bądź stanowa działa wbrew przepisom prawa ustanowionym przez Konstytucję Stanów 
Zjednoczonych i konstytucjom stanowym, samorządy mogą, przynajmniej do pewnego 
stopnia, sprzeciwić się tym autorytarnym rządom. Celem tego artykułu jest pokazanie, 
w jaki sposób samorządy lokalne mogą przeciwstawić się antydemokratycznym działa-
niom administracji federalnej i stanowej, oraz omówienie zagrożeń, jakie stwarzane są 
w Stanach Zjednoczonych w wyniku ingerencji administracji federalnej lub stanowej 
w zakres działania władzy samorządowej – szczególnie w odniesieniu do miast sanktu-
ariów, zmian klimatycznych, przepisów dotyczących posiadania broni, dostępu do tanich 
 IS STATE PREEMPTION WEAKENING THE AUTHORITARIAN... 165
mieszkań oraz praw społeczności LGBT. Głównym celem stworzenia takiej pionowej 
równowagi i podziału władzy jest wzajemne monitorowanie się administracji na różnych 
poziomach, ale jeśli samorządy lokalne są pozbawione możliwości sprawowania władzy 
w odniesieniu do ważnych społecznie kwestii, ich odporność na autorytarne rządy fede-
ralne czy stanowe jest poważnie ograniczona.
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